The Impact Of Academic Medical Center Policies Restricting Direct-To-Physician Marketing On Opioid Prescribing. Academic Article uri icon

Overview

abstract

  • Direct-to-physician opioid marketing by pharmaceutical companies is widespread and may contribute to opioid overprescribing, an important driver of the US opioid crisis. Using a difference-in-differences approach and Medicare Part D prescriber data, we examined the effects of academic medical centers' conflict-of-interest policies that restrict direct-to-physician marketing of all drugs on opioid prescribing by physicians at eighty-five centers in the period 2013-16. We examined restrictions on gifts and meals, speaking and consulting engagements, and industry representatives' access to academic medical centers, as well as rules requiring conflict-of-interest disclosures. Bans on sales representatives were associated with a 4.7 percent reduction in the total volume of opioids prescribed and disclosure requirements with a 2.5 percent reduction, while having all four marketing restriction policies was associated with an 8.8 percent reduction. Policies that restrict direct-to-physician pharmaceutical marketing may curb opioid prescribing, but additional patient-level research is needed to understand how such policies affect the delivery of evidence-based treatment for chronic pain.

publication date

  • June 1, 2020

Research

keywords

  • Analgesics, Opioid
  • Physicians

Identity

PubMed Central ID

  • PMC7876632

Scopus Document Identifier

  • 85085854672

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1377/hlthaff.2019.01289

PubMed ID

  • 32479218

Additional Document Info

volume

  • 39

issue

  • 6